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ACTION PM-05

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SUBJECT: PINCUS/PAUL VISIT TO LONDON

1. PAUL ACCCOMPANIED BY EMBOFF HAD HOUR AND HALF CONVERSATION MARCH 4 WITH ISS DIRECTOR DUCHENE AND HIS DEPUTIES BRIGADIER HUNT AND IAN SMART. DISCUSSION CENTERED ON THREE QUESTIONS POSED BY PAUL: WHAT IS ROLE OF US MILITARY IN EUROPE; WHY IS IT DESIRABLE TO MAINTAIN PRESENT FORCE LEVEL; AND WHAT WOULD BE EFFECT OF MAJOR US REDUCTIONS. MAIN POINTS MADE BY ISS OFFICIALS ARE SUMMARIZED BELOW.

2. POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF FORCE WITHDRAWAL ISSUE ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN MILITARY, ALTHOUGH MAJOR PROBLEMS WOULD BE CREATED FOR STRATEGY IF US WERE TO MAKE LARGE REDUCTIONS. FOR A GENERATION WESTERN EUROPE HAS ENJOYED A FAIR SENSE OF SECURITY THANKS TO PRESENCE US TROOPS AND US NUCLEAR GUARANTEE. THE GREAT DANGER IN US FORCE WITHDRAWALS AS THEY CONCEIVED BY SOME CIRCLES IN US (I.E. UNILATERAL WITHOUT MATCHING CUTS BY SOVIETS) IS THAT WESTERN EUROPE'S SENSE OF CONFIDENCE IN US MAY BE REPLACED BY LACK OF CONFIDENCE. IT IS A MISTAKE TO THINK THAT THE EUROPEANS WILL PLUG THE GAPS LEFT BY THE US; IF THEY DO COMPENSATE FOR WITHDRAWALS, IT WILL BE SLOWLY AT BEST. IN ADDITION TO RAISING DOUBTS IN MINDS OF EUROPEANS ABOUT FUTURE US INTENTIONS, UNILATERAL WITHDRAWALS WOULD SHAKE CONFIDENCE OF WESTERN EUROPEANS IN THEMSELVES. THE USSR REMAINS PHYSICALLY PRESENT IN EUROPE WHATEVER US DOES. IF US MAKES UNILATERAL CUTS

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WESTERN EUROPE WILL FEEL THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SHIFT IN RELATIVE WEIGHTS OF EAST AND WEST. IN ATMOSPHERE OF DETENTE STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN NATO DUE TO US ACTIONS WITHOUT COMPENSATING CHANGE IN STRENGTH OF WARSAW PACT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY PRODUCE FEELING THAT WESTERN EUROPE COULD NOT RELY ON US. MOST TROUBLESOME ASPECT OF CUTS WHICH SOME ELEMENTS IN US ARE ADVOCATING IS THAT THEY STEM PRIMARILY FROM US DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS, THAT THERE IS NO CLEAR CONCEPT OF NATO'S PRIORITIES, NO ALLIANCE VIEW, AND THAT THEY ARE NOT PRESENTED IN TERMS OF THE MILITARY NEEDS OF THE ALLIANCE.

3. MAJOR US FORCE CUTS IN EUROPE WOULD ELIMINATE THE INTER-MEDIATE STAGE IN THE DETERRENT; THE MOVE TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE EVEN FASTER THAN UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE PAUSE IS LIKELY TO BE VERY BRIEF. WITH MAJOR US CUTS, WESTERN EUROPEANS WOULD WONDER WHETHER US WOULD REALLY RISK NUCLEAR EXCHANGE WITH SOVIETS ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF SALT. US FORCE CUTS TAKE ON EVEN GREATER SIGNIFICANCE IN LIGHT OF SALT THAN THEY WOULD HAVE FEW YEARS AGO. IT IS NOT SO MUCH QUESTION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN FEAR OF A US-SOVIET DEAL OR CONDOMINIUM, BUT THAT US AND USSR MAY DEVELOP SUCH STAKE IN THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS THAT US WOULD RISK LESS FOR ITS ALLIES IN A PINCH. IN DIPLOMATIC CRISIS IN EUROPE SOVIETS MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO USE THEIR SUPERIORITY ON THE GROUND TO BRING WESTERN EUROPE AROUND, AND EUROPEANS, WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL US FORCES ON THE GROUND, WOULD FEEL THAT THEY COULD NOT COUNTER SOVIET PRESSURES. AS A RESULT EUROPE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CHOOSE ITS OWN POLICIES AND WOULD INSTEAD BEGIN TO THINK ABOUT HOW TO DEAL WITH SOVIETS.

4. IN ANSWER TO QUESTION WHAT DOES IT MATTER IF WESTERN EUROPE LOSES CONFIDENCE IN US, DUCHENE AND HIS ASSOCIATES RESPONDED THAT US AND WESTERN EUROPE WOULD FEEL LESS POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INVESTMENT IN EACH OTHER. WESTERN EUROPE MIGHT BECOME MORE PAROCHIAL AND DISPOSED TO LOOK TO USSR FOR ASSURANCE. IT WAS QUITE CONCEIVABLE THAT EUROPE WOULD BECOME BITTERLY NATIONALISTIC AND PROTECTIONIST TOWARD US. SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD LEAVE US FACING A NATIONALISTIC, DYNAMIC JAPAN AS WELL AS WESTERN EUROPE AND MAKE VERY UNLIKELY THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COHERENT INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM BASED ON COOPERATION BETWEEN NORTH AMERICA, JAPAN AND WESTERN EUROPE.

5. COHERENT APPROACH TO PROBLEM OF FORCE REDUCTIONS WOULD KEEP

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POST-1971 CUTS AS SMALL AS POSSIBLE, PROCEED AS SLOWLY AS
POSSIBLE TO ALLOW WESTERN EUROPE TIME TO DEVELOP OR TRY TO DEVELOP
COMPENSATING SOLUTIONS. ISS OFFICIALS INTIMATED THEY THOUGHT
EUROPEANS MIGHT DO MORE AT LEAST FINANCIALLY AND IN TERMS OF
IMPROVING QUALITY OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE CONTRIBUTION IF GIVEN SUF-
FICIENT TIME. MOST VITAL CONSIDERATION IN MINDS OF ALL THREE
ISS OFFICIALS WAS THAT US NOT MAKE UNILATERAL CUTS, I.E. WITHOUT
PRESSING SOVIETS HARD TO NEGOTIATE ON BFR'S. THEY SUMMED UP CASE
AGAINST US CUTS BY ASSERTING THAT NUCLEAR GUARANTEE PLUS
US MANPOWER ON THE GROUND IN EUROPE EQUALS SECURITY. SECURITY
IS NECESSARY UNDERPINNING OF DETENTE. THEY FEARED THAT THERE
WAS A TREND IN WESTERN EUROPE WHICH THOUGHT THAT EUROPE COULD
HAVE DETENTE WITHOUT SECURITY.
ANNENBERG.

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